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Central exams and adult skills: Evidence from PIAAC*
Central exams are often hypothesized to favorably affect incentive structures in schools. 
Indeed, previous research provides vast evidence on the positive effects of central exams 
on student test scores. But critics warn that these effects may arise through the strategic 
behavior of students and teachers, which may not affect human capital accumulation 
in the long run. Exploiting variation in examination types across school systems and 
over time, we provide the first evidence that central exams positively affect adult skills. 
However, our estimates are small compared to the existing estimates for students, which 
may indicate some fade-out in the effect on skills over time.
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1 Introduction
Central exams are associated with substantially higher test outcomes of students (see
Bishop, 1997; Woessmann, 2003, 2005; Jürges et al., 2005; Fuchs and Wößmann, 2008).
While this reduced-form pattern is well documented, critics warn that this result may
simply reflect differences in students’ test-taking ability, rather than actual differences
in knowledge and skills. If that were so, central exams might not genuinely improve the
productive skills of adults. Indeed, the existing evidence on the relationship between
central exams and labor market outcomes is at best mixed (Bishop et al., 2000; Backes-
Gellner and Veen, 2008; Piopiunik et al., 2013). However, there is no evidence on the
direct effect on cognitive skills of adults, and the available evidence on the long-term
impacts of central exams on labor market outcomes rests entirely on observational
studies that estimate cross-sectional regression models.
This is the first paper to study the relationship between the type of exit examination
at the end of secondary school and the cognitive skills of adults, as well as labor
market outcomes in a panel framework. For this purpose, we draw upon data from
OECD’s survey of adult skills (OECD, 2013b). Internationally, the Programme for the
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) is the most comprehensive
survey of adult skills ever undertaken. It assesses literacy and numeracy skills and the
ability to solve problems in technology-rich environments. It also collects information
on labor market outcomes and background characteristics of representative samples
of respondents aged 16-65. We supplement the PIAAC data with data on reforms of
examination regimes since 1960 for 30 countries participating in PIAAC. We collected
these data specifically for this analysis from a wide variety of sources (cf. Table A1).
The data allow us to assign to each participant of PIAAC the type of exit exam that
was in place in his or her country at the time of their graduation.
We leverage the panel structure (by graduation cohort across countries) of our data
to identify the long-term effects of central exams by exploiting within-country variation
in exam types over time and across countries.1 In particular, we estimate regression
models that include country fixed effects as well as country-specific linear trends, which
ensure that unobserved time-invariant differences in relevant characteristics or differ-
ences in linear trends across countries do not confound our estimates. To benchmark our
panel estimates, we also present results based on commonly estimated cross-sectional
1Note that exploiting this variation is different from comparing U.S. states with and without minimum
competency exams or differing graduation requirements (e.g., Baker and Lang, 2013; Bishop and Mane, 2001;
Dee and Jacob, 2007), as here graduation requirements in many cases do not change.
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models that rely entirely on strong selection-on-observable assumptions.
Our findings reveal a positive relation between central exit exams at the end of
secondary school and adult outcomes. We find that central exams increase the cognitive
skills of adults by about 7 percent of a standard deviation. Effect sizes are very similar
for numeracy and literacy, and only slightly higher for problem-solving skills. We find
no significant effects on earnings, employment, or the probability of holding a tertiary
degree. In terms of earnings, we can rule out effect sizes larger than 4,6 percent.
Our estimated effects on skills are small compared to the results of studies that
examine student skills, which typically find central exam effects of more than 10 percent
of a standard deviation. This difference might be the consequence of some fade-out in
central exam effects. Given recent estimates of the returns to adult skills based on the
same data (Hanushek et al., 2017), our small estimate of the skill effect is consistent
with not finding any earnings effects above 4,6 percent.
We also conduct a series of robustness checks that reveal some interesting aspects.
First, our main results are robust to a large set of sensitivity checks. Second, we
supplement our main analysis with comparable estimates of the central exam effect on
student skills. While these results are purely descriptive, they support the conjecture
that central exam effects on skills fade out to some extent over time. Finally, we also
provide some evidence for the existence of a positive relation between central exams
and adult skills by exploiting the variation in exam types across German federal states.
This finding within a single country concurs with our international results.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews existing
evidence on the effects of central exams. In Section 3, we describe our self-collected
longitudinal data on exit examinations, the PIAAC data as well as the construction
of our estimation sample. In Section 4, we present our empirical strategy. Section 5
presents our main results, Section 6 discusses their robustness, and Section 7 presents
further supporting evidence. Our conclusion is in Section 8.
2 Conceptual background
The theoretical foundation for our empirical analysis of the effects of central exams is
laid out in models such as Bishop and Wößmann (2004) and Bishop (2006). Central
exams may affect student skills and later outcomes through a variety of channels. First,
by providing information on the outcomes of the educational process, central exams can
improve the monitoring of the behavior of teachers and schools. Thus, central exams
may raise educational outcomes as they improve accountability in school systems. Sec-
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ond, if central exams improve the signal of educational achievement for employers and
institutions of higher education (Becker and Rosen, 1992; Schwerdt and Woessmann,
2017), they can have true productivity effects by creating incentives for students to
exert more effort.2 Hvidman and Sievertsen (2019) provide evidence that grading in-
centives in high stakes tests significantly impact students’ learning effort. Exploiting a
school reform that exogenously re-coded the GPA of high school students, the authors
show that students whose prior achievement was downgraded exerted a greater effort
in the following school years to compensate for the reform-induced demotion. Finally,
central exams may also decrease collective peer pressure against learning, because they
render futile any collective strategy to lower standards in a classroom—which again
increases learning outcomes.
An extensive empirical literature has investigated the effects of external exit ex-
ams on students’ skills. Evidence from international student achievement tests indeed
shows that students perform substantially better in countries with external exit exams
than in countries without them (see Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011, for an overview).
This pattern has been found on the 1991 International Assessment of Educational
Progress (IAEP) in math, science, and geography (Bishop, 1997), the 1991 Interna-
tional Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) Reading Lit-
eracy study (Bishop, 1999), the 1995 Third International Mathematics and Science
Study (TIMSS; cf. Bishop, 1997; Woessmann, 2003), the 1999 TIMSS-Repeat study
(Woessmann, 2005), the 2000 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)
in reading, math, and science tests (Bishop, 2006; Fuchs and Wößmann, 2008), and the
2003 PISA reading, math, and science tests (Woessmann et al., 2009). These studies
suggest that the effects of external exit exams on student achievement may well be
larger than a whole grade-level equivalent, or between 20 and 40 percent of a standard
deviation of the respective international tests. Studies in countries with regional vari-
ations in exam systems find similar results. Positive effects of external exit exams on
test-score outcomes have been shown for Canadian provinces (Bishop, 1997, 1999), for
U.S. states (e.g., Graham and Husted, 1993; Bishop et al., 2000), and for German states
(Jürges et al., 2005; Jürges and Schneider, 2010; Jürges et al., 2012; Lüdemann, 2011).
To probe causality, Jürges et al. (2005) apply a differences-in-differences approach to
the German TIMSS 1995 data that exploits the fact that in some secondary-school
tracks, the states with central exit exams have exams in math but not in science, find-
ing a smaller, but still substantial, effect of about 0.13 of a national standard deviation.
2In a similar spirit, principal-agent models of educational standards model how educational credentials
affect the level of learning effort that students choose (e.g., Costrell, 1997; Betts, 1998).
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More recently, Bergbauer et al. (2018) show that an expansion in standardized exter-
nal comparisons is associated with improvements in student achievement. Their panel
analysis is based on a dataset of more than 2 million students in 59 countries observed
over six waves in the international PISA student achievement test 2000–2015, and ex-
ploits reforms in assessment systems over time for identification. Most importantly,
they show that both school-based and student-based external comparisons have posi-
tive effects on student achievement, where their definition of a student-based external
comparison is closely aligned with our definition of a central exam.3
But students’ higher test scores, as induced by central exams, may not automati-
cally translate into better outcomes for adults. External testing could also have negative
effects (see Figlio and Loeb, 2011, for a review). Critics often argue that test-based ac-
countability systems may raise only test-taking skills, not genuine educational achieve-
ment (see Popham, 2001; Koretz, 2002; Volante, 2004). Increased test scores can also
just be due to fraudulent behavior like outright cheating, as educators have an incentive
to improve observed test outcomes (for example, Jacob and Levitt, 2003). In addition,
Jürges and Schneider (2010) find that while central exit exams do improve students’
academic skills, they negatively affect students’ attitudes toward learning, as indicated
in self-reported enjoyment of mathematics. And Jürges et al. (2012) indicate that the
positive effect of central exams on curriculum-based knowledge does not extend to a
positive effect on mathematical literacy.4
Only a few studies have investigated the relationship between central exams and
adult outcomes. Backes-Gellner and Veen (2008) and Piopiunik et al. (2013) study la-
bor market outcomes exploiting cross-sectional variations in exit exams across German
federal states. Backes-Gellner and Veen (2008) fail to find a positive effect of central
school exit exams on labor-market earnings for graduates of the highest school track
of the highly tracked German school system. But Piopiunik et al. (2013) show that
graduates from the lowest track have higher earnings if they received their high school
leaving certificate in a state with central exams. Piopiunik et al. (2013) also show that
graduates from both low-track and high-track schools have lower rates of unemploy-
ment when their school exit exam was centrally administered. However, these findings
may be specific to Germany’s rigid labor market, where earnings structures are mostly
determined by central bargaining.
3In fact, Bergbauer et al. (2018) use our compiled dataset of the existence of central exit exams at the end
of secondary school to create their measure of student-based external comparisons.
4Jürges et al. (2012) distinguish between test achievements reflecting the German mathematics curriculum
and achievements in applying the knowledge to real world issues (i.e., mathematical literacy).
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For the United States, Bishop et al. (2000) provide evidence on the effects of external
exit exams, but their analysis ultimately boils down to a comparison of New York
State to the remaining states. Wider variation across U.S. states is restricted to course
graduation requirements and minimum competency exams, which assess only low-level
skills in public schools and have no consequences for university entrance. Based on
longitudinal data that allows linking the exam type of individual students with later
labor-market outcomes, Bishop and Mane (2001) find minimum competency exams, but
not mere course graduation requirements, to be positively associated with earnings.
Our paper directly contributes to this literature on central exams by providing a
first analysis of the direct effect of central exams on adult skills, and a first analysis
of the effect on labor market outcomes, in a panel framework that exploits several
reforms to examination systems across a wide range of countries. We believe that this
extension is important for several reasons. First, the existing evidence on the effect on
labor market outcomes is based on regression models that exploit variation in exam
regimes across regions. The evidence is therefore prone to biases arising because of
unobserved institutional or cultural differences across regions. Second, the existing
evidence on labor market effects is also limited to specific countries and might not
be generalizable. Third, studying the direct effect of central exams on adult skills is
important because positive effects of centralized examination systems may also arise
through other channels besides increased human capital accumulation. For example,
central exams may facilitate the matching process between vacancies and workers, as
it allows for an improved sorting of students by productive skills. This may increase
overall productivity in the long run.
3 Data
In this section we describe our data collection and the construction of our estimation
sample. We also elaborate on how we match our data on exit examinations in 30
countries to individual-level data of the Programme for the International Assessment
of Adult Competencies (PIAAC).
3.1 Longitudinal data on central exit exams
We begin our discussion with a definition of central exams, based on Bishop (1997,
1999). A central school leaving examination (in short, a central exam) is a mandatory
written test, administered by a central authority (such as a ministry of education),
that provides centrally developed, curriculum-based test questions covering such core
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subjects as math and the mother tongue. The standardized questions should test con-
tent that is taught during upper-secondary schooling rather than general skills. Central
exams impose consistent test implementation, grading, and passing threshold. Thus,
central exams set external and consistent quality standards of secondary education, and
ensure comparability of students’ performance. Additionally, achievement in a central
exam—and, especially, failing a central exam—is required to have direct consequences
for students who take the exam, for example by representing a significant part of the
final grade and by a limited number of valid retakes. Finally, central exams can be
organized either on a national or regional level and must be mandatory for a cohort in
a certain school track to ensure that a sufficient number of students take the exam.5
Following Bishop (1998 and 1997), we do not consider commercially prepared tests
such as the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT), American College Testing (ACT), or the
California Achievement Test (CAT) to be central exams. These tests do not have direct
consequences for students, and students can retake them multiple times. What is more,
their content is not necessarily curriculum-specific, nor are these tests mandatory.
We also distinguish between university entrance exams and high school leaving
exams, as only students who are aiming to attend a university typically participate
in university entrance exams. But participating in a centrally organized university
entrance exam is very common in Japan and Korea, even among students who do not
actually intend to start tertiary education. Thus, we include these two countries in our
definition of central exams in our preferred specification, but also show that our main
results are robust to excluding these two countries from our analysis.
While our treatment is well defined, the counterfactual is not. School systems may
not satisfy our definition of having a central exam for a variety of reasons. On the
one hand, there might be a general absence of any school leaving exam (as in Spain
and Belgium). On the other hand, some school leaving exams violate our definition
across one or more dimensions. For example, exit exams could be administered at the
local level (as in Greece and some federal states in Germany), may not be mandated
for graduation (Sweden after 1968), may fail to have direct consequences for graduates
(perhaps because of the option of multiple retakes, as with CAT and SAT tests), or
may not be curriculum-based (as in many U.S. states).
For this analysis, we make use of a large variety of sources to collect data on exit
exams at the end of secondary school. Our sources include international and national
publications, both offline and online sources, and personal communications with coun-
5See Bishop (1997, pg. 260) for a more detailed list of characteristics of a central exam.
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try experts. We provide a detailed documentation of our country-specific sources in
Appendix—Table A1 and visualize the variation in central exam regimes by country
and graduation cohort in Figure 1.
The history of national central exams started in France, where nationwide coordi-
nated testing of high school graduates dates back to the early 19th century. Denmark
followed 100 years later in 1908. In 1919 and 1923, Finland, Italy, and Israel introduced
central exam systems, followed by Ireland, UK, Norway, and the Netherlands from the
1950s through the 1960s.6 New Zealand implemented central exams, according to our
definition, in 1968, and Singapore did so in 1975, shortly after gaining independence.
Japan and Korea introduced centrally administered university entrance exams in 1979
and 1994. The more recent, larger wave of countries implementing central exams took
place in Eastern Europe at the turn of the 21th century, with Estonia in 1997, Lithua-
nia in 2002, Poland and the Slovak Republic in 2005, and the Czech Republic in 2011.
Cyprus also introduced central exams in 2006.
The only countries that never introduced central exams until 2012, or 2015 for
countries sampled in the second wave of PIAAC, are Belgium, Austria, Chile, Spain,
and Turkey.7 Sweden and Greece currently have no central exams, but these two
are interesting cases. Sweden abolished mandatory central exams in 1968.8 Greece
introduced central exams in 1983 but abolished them in 2005, so we only consider
graduation cohorts in Greece who graduated between 1983 and 2005 as being exposed
to central exams.
The education systems in Canada, Germany, and the United States are organized
at the province or state level rather than nationally. Examination systems also vary
within these countries. Table A2 provides detailed information on these variations over
time.
Currently, six of Canada’s 13 provinces have centralized school leaving exams.9
Three provinces—Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Ontario—abolished central exams in
the 1960s and 1970s, but Manitoba reintroduced them in 1991. In the U.S., according
6Israel introduced the “Bagrut” central exams before its independence, during the British Mandate of
Palestine (1920–1948).
7Austria only recently introduced central exams in the 2015/16 school year. Therefore, Austria is treated
as a non-central exam country for the purpose of our analysis.
8Swedish students still have the option of taking a centralized exam, but since this is entirely voluntary it
does not meet our definition of a central exam. This coding is in line with Bishop (1998) and the assessment of
country experts. Fuchs and Wößmann (2008), however, assumed for Sweden a share of 50 percent of students
participating in central exams in the year 2000. Our results do not change if we assume a factor of 0.5 for
Sweden after 1968.
9In the province of New Brunswick, the francophone sector introduced central exams in 1991; the anglophone
sector has yet to do so.
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to our definition, only New York State introduced central exams in 2003. During the
2000s, other U.S. states introduced curriculum-based school leaving exams, the so-called
end of course exams (EoC exams), or made participating in the commercial ACT or
SAT a mandatory part of graduation. A further limitation is that students can retake
those tests multiple times, so they fail to provide a universal signal of graduate skills.10
By 2012, all of Germany’s federal states but one (Rhineland-Palatine) had in-
troduced central exams at the end of secondary education. Three states—Baden-
Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, and Saarland—were the first to introduce central exams, be-
tween the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Before the German reunification, the former
GDR states (or new federal states) also had some form of central exams in place (Kühn,
2010) but except for the state of Thuringia, they initially abolished central exams af-
ter reunification. However, all former GDR states quickly reintroduced central exams
in the 1990s. In the 2000s, a number of other states, including Brandenburg, Ham-
burg, Berlin, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, Bremen, Hesse, and Schleswig-
Holstein, switched to central exam regimes.11
Since PIAAC data does not provide information on the province or state of resi-
dence for surveyed individuals, we follow the common practice in empirical studies on
central exams and assign a central exam factor to graduation cohorts in countries with
education systems organized at a sub-national level (for example, Fuchs and Wößmann,
2008).12 For this purpose, we weight regional central exam dummies for each state and
each graduation year with the state’s respective population share in 2012. Aggregat-
ing the weighted dummies, we obtain a single factor at the country level. For a given
graduation cohort and on the federal level, this factor should roughly reflect the prob-
ability that an individual was exposed to a central exam regime. Figure 1 displays the
evolution of these factors for the three countries in our sample with federal education
systems. These factors range in the U.S. from 0 to 0.063, in Canada from 0.72 to 0.53,
and in Germany from 0.33 to 0.95.
3.2 PIAAC data
The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies, was devel-
oped by the OECD to provide internationally comparable data on adult skills (OECD,
2013a; OECD, 2016). The first round of PIAAC was administered to 22 countries be-
10For a detailed survey of high school graduation testing across U.S. states, see Caves and Balestra (2018).
11For a detailed summary of the German school system, see Jürges et al. (2005), Lüdemann (2011), or
Schwerdt and Woessmann (2017).
12Germany is an exception, as we can identify the federal state of residence in the German data. We exploit
this information in Section 6.3.
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tween August 2011 and March 2012; the second was administered to an additional eight
countries between April 2014 and March 2015. The two waves combined thus provide
comparable skill data for 30 countries.13 In each participating country, a representative
sample of at least 5,000 adults between 16 and 65 years of age was interviewed at home
in the language of their country of residence. The standard survey mode was to answer
questions on a computer, but respondents without sufficient computer knowledge could
also do a pencil-and-paper survey.
PIAAC was designed to measure key cognitive and workplace skills needed for in-
dividuals to advance at work and participate in society. The survey assessed cognitive
skills in three domains: numeracy, literacy, and problem-solving in technology-rich en-
vironments.14 The tasks that respondents had to solve were often framed as real-world
problems, such as maintaining a driver’s logbook (numeracy domain) or reserving a
meeting room on a particular date using a reservation system (problem-solving do-
main). The domains are described in more detail in OECD (2013a). For analytical
purposes, we standardize skills in the full sample to have mean zero and standard de-
viation (SD) one, and employ the sample weights provided in PIAAC. In the empirical
analysis, we focus on numeracy skills, which we deem most comparable across countries,
but we report the results for the other two skill domains as well.
We also investigate whether central exams affect labor market and education out-
comes. For this analysis, we make use of the data on labor-market status, earnings,
education, and demographic characteristics, as provided by PIAAC. Specifically, we
estimate central exam effect on gross hourly earnings of wage and salary workers, em-
ployment status, and educational attainment. These outcome measures have been
used previously in the literature analyzing PIAAC data (for example Hanushek et al.,
2015).15
We match our self-collected data on exam regimes to the PIAAC data by country
of residence and year of completion of the highest level of schooling. That is, we assign
to each PIAAC participant the type of exit examination at the end of high school
that was in place in his or her country at the time of their graduation. High school
13The actual number of countries surveyed in the first and the second PIAAC rounds was 24 and 9. Following
the OECD recommendation, we excluded Russia because the Russian sample doesn’t cover the population of
the Moscow region. We also had to exclude Australia because of restrictive access to the Australian data.
From the second-round countries, we excluded Indonesia as it withdrew its participation in the PIAAC study
and submitted only data from the Jakarta region.
14Participation in the problem-solving domain was optional; Cyprus, France, Italy, and Spain did not par-
ticipate in this domain.
15In particular, see Hanushek et al. (2015) for detailed information on the construction of our earnings
measure.
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graduation in the PIAAC data is defined as having completed at least the Level 3a of
the International Standard of Classification of Education (ISCED), according to the
1997 classification. As PIAAC provides information on the highest educational degree
obtained and the age at which individuals left full-time education, we can derive the
year of graduation directly for individuals whose highest educational degree is the high
school diploma. Individuals who report having not graduated from high school are
kept in our baseline sample and are assigned to the graduation cohort corresponding
to the year they report having left full-time education. For individuals with higher
educational degrees, we assume their graduation age to be the country-specific median
age at high school graduation among those with high school as their highest degree.
To ensure that all individuals in our sample have been exposed to at least two years of
secondary schooling, we restrict our baseline sample to individuals with a graduation
age of 15 or above.16
Note that our matching procedure implies a specific treatment definition, as some
individuals in our sample will be considered to have been exposed to a central exam
regime even though central exams were only introduced in their final high school year.
Thus, some students whom we consider to be treated, might not themselves have par-
ticipated in a central exam. However, they may be indirectly affected by the change
in exam regimes (such as by spillover effects of increased school accountability). As a
consequence, the treatment we are studying here could be described as “at least some
(direct or indirect) exposure to a central exam regime.”
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our baseline sample in all 30 countries by
exam regime. The table shows that, on average, individuals exposed to central exams
are quite different from those in non-central exam regimes. In particular, they are
more skilled, earn more, are more likely to be employed, and are more likely to hold
a tertiary degree. These differences are not surprising, as the younger population is
over-represented in the central exam category.
4 Empirical strategy
We estimate the effect of central exams on adult outcomes based on regression models
of the following kind:
yicg = β CEcg +X
′
icgγ + δc + θg + λcg + εicg, (1)
16Results are, however, almost identical when early school leavers are not excluded from the sample. See
Table 4, “Incl. early leavers” row .
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where yicg is the outcome of individual i in country c belonging to graduation cohort g,
CEcg is a dummy that indicates whether an individual belonging to graduation cohort
g in country c was exposed to a central exit exam, δc is a country fixed effect, θg is a
graduation cohort fixed effect, λcg is a country-specific linear trend in graduation years,
Xicg is a vector of student background variables, and εicg is an idiosyncratic error.
The key parameter of interest is β. It captures the effect of graduating in a central
as opposed to non-central exam regime. By leveraging the panel nature of our data at
the cohort-country level, we identify β in our preferred model solely based on within-
country variation in examination regimes across graduation cohorts.17 In particular,
our identification strategy makes use of the fact that some countries changed their
exam regimes in different years between 1960 and 2012, while others did not. Thus,
unobserved institutional or cultural differences across countries that have a constant
impact on adult outcomes do not bias our estimates.
Note that our preferred specification also includes country-specific linear trends in
graduation years, λcg. This allows us to control, to some extent, for country-specific
confounders that have a different impact on outcomes across graduation cohorts. This
might be important, as Stephens and Yang (2014) have shown, in the context of studies
exploiting reforms to compulsory schooling laws for identification, that identification
based on the timing of policy changes across states over time can be very sensitive to
the inclusion of state-specific trends.
To benchmark our preferred estimates, we also estimate commonly estimated cross-
sectional regression models that do not control for country-specific effects. And in
Section 6 we conduct a wide range of sensitivity checks and a permutation test to
assess the robustness of our main results.
Throughout the empirical analysis, we estimate and report standard errors clustered
at the country by graduation cohort level. We also follow other cross-country studies
based on PIAAC data (such as Hanushek et al., 2015) and estimate weighted regressions
using sampling weights, which we adjusted so that each country is given the same weight
to account for different sample sizes across PIAAC countries.
5 Results
All else being equal, do central exams at the end of secondary education affect adult
outcomes? In addressing this question, we begin with a set of estimates of the effects on
17Other studies that exploit variation in the exposure to education policies across cohorts in cross-sectional
data for identification include Pischke (2007) and Pischke and von Wachter (2008).
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adult skills, before presenting estimates of the effects on labor market and educational
outcomes.
5.1 The effect of central exams on adult skills
We report our main estimates of the effects of central exams on adult skills in Table 2.
Before presenting estimates of our preferred model given by Equation 1 in columns
3 to 8, we start by presenting a set of benchmark estimates that do not control for
unobserved heterogeneity across countries in columns 1 to 3. As skill measures are
standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, the coefficient of
interest can be interpreted as the effect of central exams on adult skills measured in
percent of a standard deviation of the respective skill distribution.
Across the different specifications, there is clear evidence that central exams are
positively related to adult skills. Without taking into account any control variables
and unobserved heterogeneity across countries, graduates in central exam regimes out-
perform graduates in non-central exam regimes by about 20 percent of a standard
deviation in the numeracy test. The estimate decreases slightly to about 17 percent
when controlling for individual background characteristics and the age at graduation.
Interestingly, these effect sizes are comparable to estimates of central exam effects on
student skills based on cross-sectional data (for example Bishop, 1997; Woessmann,
2002; Fuchs and Wößmann, 2008). The estimates on the background variables reveal
several typical features of estimated education production functions that are in line
with previous evidence.
Turning to our panel estimates, we observe that estimates become much smaller
in absolute terms, but remain positive and significant. Including country fixed effects
suggests that central exams increase numeracy skills on average by about 7 percent of a
standard deviation. Introducing a country-specific linear time trend in column 4, does
not change this estimate. For literacy skills, estimated effects are similar to those for
numeracy, while the estimated effect on problem-solving skills is somewhat larger, at 9
percent of a standard deviation.
Our estimates on adult skills are about half the size of well-identified estimates of
central exam effects on student skills (such as Jürges et al., 2005). This may indicate
that the effect of central exams fades out as individuals grow older, which may reflect
that part of the initial effect on student test scores is indeed driven by an increased test-
taking ability gained during secondary education by students in central exam regimes.
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5.2 The effect of central exams on labor market outcomes
To investigate whether the increase in adult skills induced by central exams also trans-
lates into better labor market outcomes, in Table 3 we report estimates of the central
exam effects on earnings, employment, and college degree. The first column in Table
3 reports coefficient estimates of variants of Equation 1, with individual earnings as
dependent variable. In column 2 we report estimates of the effect on employment.18
Finally, we test whether central exams affect the probability of completing tertiary
education and receiving a high school diploma in columns 3 and 4, respectively.19
Once we control for unobserved country-specific trends, we do not find any signif-
icant effects on these outcomes. Most importantly, our estimates let us rule out the
existence of earnings estimates larger than 4,6 percent.20 This finding is, however,
consistent with the finding of effects on adult skills of about 7 percent of a standard
deviation if central exams affect earnings primarily through a skill production channel.
Hanushek et al. (2017) report an average wage return to a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in numeracy skills of 20 percent. Based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation,
we should in this case expect that a shift in skills of 7 percent of a standard deviation
would produce a shift in earnings of only about 1 percent. Interestingly, our point
estimate actually suggests an effect on earnings of about 1 percent, but we lack the
statistical power to detect such small effect sizes.21
6 Robustness
In this section we conduct a set of sensitivity checks to assess the robustness of our
main results.
6.1 Sensitivity checks
We begin by reporting estimates of a series of sensitivity checks in Table 4. To consol-
idate our presentation, we report estimates of the central exam effect based on all six
outcomes in the first row. As shown in the second row of Table 4, our results prove to
be mainly robust to estimating regression models that do not use any survey weights.
18Any participant in PIAAC who reports positive labor earnings is coded as employed.
19Note that in columns 3 and 4, we follow Hanushek et al. (2015) and exclude workers below age 25, as they
are not likely to have completed their first phase of full-time education.
20The upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval of the earnings estimate in the first column of Table
3 is 0.0461.
21The calculation is as follows: Central exams positively affect skills by about 7 percent of a standard
deviation, while a standard deviation increase in skills increases earnings by about 20 percent (see Hanushek
et al., 2017)). Thus, the expected effect of central exams on earnings is 0.07× 20, which comes to 1.4 percent.
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Another robustness concern may be that the graduation year is partly endogenous to
the type of exit exam. We test the relevance of this concern by making an alternative
assumption about the graduation age of individuals. Estimations in the third row are
based on assigning the median graduation age within a country to all graduates in
the country. The results show the robustness of our main results to this alternative
assumption about individuals’ graduation age. Finally, we show that our main results
are generally robust to the inclusion of individuals who report having left school before
age 15.
While some degree of country heterogeneity can be expected, another key concern
is that our overall finding is entirely driven by a specific country. To investigate this
possibility, we estimate our preferred specification several times, each time excluding
a different country. Table 5 presents the results from this piecewise deletion exercise.
The results are very similar, which shows that our main result is not driven by any
specific country.
6.2 Permutation test
To check whether our estimates are driven by an accidental correlation between changes
in exam regimes and other unobserved discrete changes that impact skill development,
we conduct a placebo analysis in the spirit of the placebo and permutation tests con-
ducted in Chetty et al. (2009).22 Our placebo check replaces the actual year of the
reform with a randomly chosen year between 1960 and 2012 for each of the 13 de facto
regime-changing countries. We repeat this randomization procedure 2,000 times, esti-
mating the reform effect on adult skills based on our baseline specification for each of
those 2,000 iterations.23
Figure 2 displays the empirical cumulative distribution of central exam effect esti-
mates from the 2,000 placebo randomizations. The results reveal that more than 95
percent of the placebo estimates are well below our baseline estimate. In most cases,
estimates are close to zero and insignificant. Actually, the probability that the baseline
effect of 0.067 would appear by an accidental correlation is 0.03. Thus, this exercise re-
22Chetty et al. (2009) use the test to check for robustness in their estimates of posting-tax on demand effect.
They estimate a placebo effect immediately before and immediately after the posting-tax experiment in order
to check for unusual patterns in demand around the timing of the experiment.
23Note that the direction of the placebo policy change is assumed to be identical to the actual direction of the
reform, i.e., abolishment or introduction of central exams. For Greece, which experienced two changes in exam
regimes between 1960 and 2012, the randomization assumes that the first randomized year of change must be
smaller than the second. For simplicity, in this analysis we dropped the three countries with federal education
systems. The data for the 14 countries that didn’t change their central exam regime are not manipulated in
this placebo analysis.
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veals that the potential for discrete changes in unobserved impacts on skills that could
generate effect sizes comparable to our baseline estimate is very low in our data.
6.3 Exploiting within-country variation
For the German subsample, PIAAC provides identifiers for the respondents’ federal
state of residence, which allows us to exploit the variation in exam regimes across
federal states within a single country. The results should be directly comparable to the
findings of Backes-Gellner and Veen (2008) and Piopiunik et al. (2013).
Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. The set of controls used for the skills
outcomes (columns 1 to 3) is identical to Table 2, and the set of controls used for labor
market outcomes (columns 4 to 6) is identical to Table 3’s. Given that we cannot use
specification with state (Länder) fixed effects, the estimate for numeracy in Table 6
corresponds to the international estimate in column 2 of our baseline table (Table 2).
For numeracy and literacy skills, we find a significant positive association with cen-
tral exams. The estimates for problem-solving skills are also positive and economically
important, but only weakly significant. Our estimated effect of 0.11 for numeracy is
fairly close to the preferred effect of central exams to the TIMSS math score, namely
0.13 of national standard deviation, as evidenced by Jürges et al. (2005).
As for labor market outcomes, we do not find a significant link between central
exams and earnings, but we do find a positive and highly significant relation with
employment probabilities. This pattern is broadly in line with the estimation results
of Backes-Gellner and Veen (2008) and Piopiunik et al. (2013), which exploit the same
variation but use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for their
analysis.
While these associations do not necessarily warrant a causal interpretation, overall
they support the interpretation of our baseline estimates. In particular, they increase
confidence in the validity of our analysis of the labor market effects of central exams in
PIAAC, as we find a pattern of results that is similar to the existing evidence on the
same association based on an independent data source.
6.4 Other education reforms
Another concern is that education reforms often come in packages that not only target
a specific element (such as introducing central exams) but also impact multiple levels
of an education system. Thus, the effect that we’re capturing in our analysis might
not be attributable solely to changes in the central versus local nature of exit exams if
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other elements of the education system systematically covary with exit exam systems.
Our database on exit exams is the result of a substantial data collection effort that
specifically focused on collecting information on exit exams. While we are confident
that we can adequately capture changes in the central versus local nature of exit exams
in the 30 PIAAC countries between 1960 and 2012, we have no time-varying information
on other elements of the education systems. Thus, we have no formal way of testing
whether other features of education systems systematically covary with exit exams.
We did, however, further investigate the reforms to the exam systems we have
identified, and checked what other features of the education systems might have changed
simultaneously. Specifically, for the countries that either introduced or abolished central
exams in 1960–2012, we also collected information on other education reforms that had
been passed during the time frame of five years before and after the respective change
to the exam system. While we have not been successful in all cases, we see no clear
pattern suggesting that there is indeed a common set of other institutional changes
that typically accompanies changes in exit exams in the countries where we can study
this.
To provide just two examples, we elaborate further on the cases of Sweden and
Greece.24 Sweden abolished central exams in a comprehensive upper-secondary educa-
tion reform in 1968. With this reform, the former division of academic and vocational
post-compulsory education was rescinded and a common curriculum was implemented
for all school tracks. Prior to the reform, academic upper-secondary schools, upper-
secondary technical schools, junior colleges of commerce, and the two-year continua-
tion schools had already been brought under the control of a single authority in 1964.
After the of the 1968 reform, substantial effort was devoted to modernizing vocational
education at the upper-secondary level and preparing the work force for the economic
challenges of the time (Lundahl et al., 2010; Garrouste, 2010). The 1983 introduction
of central exams in Greece was also surrounded by other education reforms. Law 186,
passed in 1975, brought changes in teachers’ recruitment, training, and salaries. In
1976, Law 309 laid the foundation for changes at the organizational and administrative
level of general education, and established several councils to address teachers’ working
conditions.25 The Presidential Decree of 1978, and Law 1286 and Law 1304 of 1982,
further reformed teacher recruitment and training. Law 1566, passed in 1985, targeted
24A more comprehensive documentation of our investigation of educational reforms surrounding changes to
the examination system is available upon request.
25Law 309 also replaced classical Greek by modern Greek as official language and extended compulsory
schooling from 6 to 9 years (Garrouste, 2010).
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the structure and operation of primary and secondary education, and again set higher
training standards for teachers (Garrouste, 2010).
These two examples show that changes to exam systems are indeed, in some cases,
embedded in a larger set of reforms that typically share a specific educational philosophy
or are aimed at achieving common objectives. Thus, a more careful interpretation of
our results shows that educational reform packages that typically include strengthening
the central nature of exit exams as one element do lead to higher adult skills, while
a change in the central versus local nature of exit exams alone might have no effect.
However, our investigation of other reforms does not suggest that there actually was a
set of other institutional changes that systematically accompanied the changes in the
exam regimes we are studying. In fact, while we admit that we cannot fully exclude
the possibility that we missed some reforms or specific elements of reforms, we believe
that it is generally a strength of our empirical strategy that we exploit not just a
specific reform for identification, but several reforms implemented in different countries
in different decades. The one shared element of all these reforms is that they changed
the central versus local nature of exit exams at the end of high school.
7 Heterogeneous effects
In this section we explore potential effect heterogeneities. We are particularly interested
in understanding whether central exam effects vary across different subgroups of the
population, whether reforms introducing or abolishing central exams have immediate
effects on student performance, and whether the effect of central exams on individuals’
skills tends to decay over time.
7.1 Subgroup analysis
Overall, we provide evidence for the average effects of central exams on adult skills
and labor market outcomes. But this may conceal a substantial detrimental effect of
central exams for some students. In Table 7 we address this concern by replicating our
main analyses for specific subgroups of the population. Overall, the results of these
analyses provide no evidence of detrimental effects of central exams for any subgroup.
In the broader literature on school accountability, one issue that is often discussed is
whether school accountability policies can effectively decrease gaps in student outcomes
for disadvantaged groups.26 Such effect heterogeneities could arise if central exams act
26For example, Hanushek and Raymond (2005) find that the U.S.-wide National Assessment of Educational
Progress narrowed the Hispanic-White gap, but actually increased the Black-White gap.
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as a strong monitoring instrument in schools, which may especially benefit students
whose socioeconomic backgrounds are otherwise less likely to detect or to react to
educational failures.
Table 7 reveals, however, that the effect of central exams on adult skills is largely
independent of social background. We find positive effects on skills for all groups. With
respect to the educational background of their parents, we find that effects, if anything,
may be slightly larger for students from more educated households. Interestingly, the
estimates of the effects on earnings point in a different direction. While the effects
are not significantly different from zero for individuals from more educated households,
individuals whose parents lack a secondary degree actually seem to benefit from central
exams in terms of their later earnings. With respect to migration background, we find
that second-generation migrants benefit slightly more from central exams in terms of
their skill development, but differential effects on labor market outcomes do not exist.
Finally, gender may be another important aggravating or mitigating factor. For
example, central exams may reduce the relative competition for good grades within
a class, as all the students are evaluated with respect to an external standard. This
may trigger behavioral responses that differ by gender. Our subgroup analysis indeed
reveals some positive effects of central exams on labor market outcomes for women,
but not for men. But the positive effects of central exams on skills are similar across
gender, which suggests that the more positive effects on labor market outcomes for
women is unlikely to be driven by any differential impact of central exams by gender
on skill development.
7.2 Time to effect
The introduction of central exams might not be effective from the onset.27 On the
one hand, this could be the case if teachers and schools initially face problems with
implementation or adjustment. On the other hand, it might take some time for the
accountability mechanism set in motion by the introduction of central exams to unfold
its full impact. If centralized exams indeed make differences in school quality salient, it
might be a year or two until parents, teachers, and schools react to this new information
and adjust their behavior in ways that will ultimately lead to more effective learning
and teaching.
We test for this “time to effect” assertion by estimating variants of Equation 1,
27In a different policy context, for example, Hanushek and Raymond (2005) show gradual growth of the
acceptance of the National Assessment of Educational Progress criteria across U.S. states over the 1993-2002
period.
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which allow for heterogenous impacts of central exams by years of existence of the
central exam policy. In particular, we interact the central exam dummy with two
dummies indicating whether central exams exist in a country for more than two and
five years, respectively.28
Table 8 shows the results of this analysis. Our findings suggest that the impact
of the introduction of central exams unfolds with a delay of about two years. The
estimates in columns 2 and 3 show that the central exam effect becomes statistically
significant two years after the policy change. Thereafter, the effect of central exams
does not appear to increase any further. Overall, this finding for the effects on adult
skills is consistent with evidence presented in Lüdemann (2011), who studies reforms
of test regimes in German federal states in a difference-in-differences design, and shows
that central exam effects already affect student skills in the short run.
7.3 Fade-out of central exam effects
Comparing our results with findings of the existing literature on student skills can
be informative about the extent of fade-out in the effects of central exams. However,
differences in sample populations potentially blur this comparison. We address this
concern at least partly by investigating simple correlations between central exams and
the skills of both students and adults for samples drawn from the same population.
Specifically, PISA 2000 surveyed a representative sample of 15-year-old students in
2000. Thus, the PISA sample should be sampled from about the same population as
the subsample of PIAAC participants who were 15 years old in 2000. Similarly, we
construct a correspondence data set for the TIMSS Repeat (1998/1999) data.
We report the results of this exercise in Table 9. All estimates stem from simple re-
gressions of skills on a central exam dummy that differs across countries. Unfortunately,
there is only a limited set of countries that participated in both PIAAC and PISA 2000
(columns 1 and 2) and countries that participated in both PIAAC and TIMSS Repeat
(columns 3 and 4). The estimates are all insignificant, but the estimated coefficients
in the student data are large and roughly comparable in size to the analogous esti-
mates reported in studies that use the PIAAC 2000 and TIMSS Repeat data to study
the central exam effect on student skills (for example, Woessmann, 2002; Fuchs and
Wößmann, 2008; Jürges et al., 2005). Most notably, the estimated coefficients on the
28For presentation reasons, we chose a model with just two interactions at two and five years after the policy
change. A more flexible model with interactions for each year reveals that this split roughly captures the
overall pattern of effect heterogeneities quite well. Results of the model with interactions for each year after
the policy change are available upon request.
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central exam dummy are one third to one half lower if the dependent variable is adult
skills rather than student skills. Thus, this crude comparison of simple correlations
between central exams and skills based on comparable samples also indicates that the
association between central exams and skills becomes weaker over time.
8 Conclusion
This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between the type of exit examina-
tion at the end of secondary school and the cognitive skills and labor market outcomes
of adults, using a panel framework. We find that central exams increase the cognitive
skills of adults by about 7 percent of a standard deviation.
Compared to the results of studies that examine student skills, which typically find
central exam effects between 10 and 20 percent of a standard deviation, the estimates
of the long-run effects on skills are small. This difference might be the consequence of
some fade-out in central exam effects—which, in turn, might occur because part of the
central exam effects on students was driven by a higher test-taking ability of students
in central exam regimes, an ability that does not affect human capital accumulation in
the long run.
In terms of labor market outcomes, we do not detect any significant effects. In
particular, our statistical power allows us to rule out effects on earnings above 4,6
percent. But this finding is consistent with recent evidence on the average wage return
to increases in adult skills of about 7 percent of a standard deviation, if we assume that
central exams affect earnings only through their impact on skill production.
These findings contribute to the growing literature on accountability systems in
schools in general, and the literature on central exams in particular. Overall, our results
corroborate the notion of the positive effects of central exams on skill development.
However, our finding of comparatively small effects on adult skills might suggest that
larger estimates of the effect of standardized testing in secondary education are, to
some extent, driven by short-run improvements in students’ test scores, which have no
impact on skill development in the long run.
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Hörner, W., H. Döbert, B. von Kopp, and W. Mitter (2007). The education systems of
Europe. Springer.
Hvidman, U. and H. H. Sievertsen (2019). High-stakes grades and student behavior.
Journal of Human Resources , forthcoming.
Ilc, G., V. R. Gabrovec, and A. Stopar (2014). Relating the Slovenian secondary school
English language national examinations to the CEFR: Findings and implications.
Linguistica 54 (1), 293–308.
Jacob, B. A. and S. D. Levitt (2003). Rotten apples: An investigation of the prevalence
and predictors of teacher cheating. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3), 843–877.
23
Jürges, H., W. F. Richter, and K. Schneider (2005). Teacher quality and incentives:
Theoretical and empirical effects of standards on teacher quality. Finanz Archiv:
Public Finance Analysis 61 (3), 298–326.
Jürges, H. and K. Schneider (2010). Central exit examinations increase performance...
but take the fun out of mathematics. Journal of Population Economics 23 (2), 497–
517.
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Estimated placebo effects
Note: The figure displays the empirical distribution of placebo estimates of central exam effects based on 2,000
randomizations of central exam change. The randomizations are based on the 27-countries sample that excludes
the three federal education systems, and use the specification (4) of Table 2. The vertical line corresponds to
the effect estimate of .067 for the sample without the three federal education systems reported in Table 5.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
No central exams Central exams
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean diff.
Numeracy .053 (.962) .227 (.932) .174
Literacy .017 (.935) .235 (.916) .218
Problem-solving −.118 (.989) .132 (.938) .25
Earnings 2.44 (.754) 2.8 (.636) .361
Employment .553 .619 .066
College degree .299 .371 .072
Age 42.8 (13.8) 36.6 (14.3) −6.2
Age at graduation 18.5 (3.38) 18.7 (4.22) .226
Female .495 .498 .0034
Second-gen. migrant .088 .14 .051
Parent education:
Primary .395 .324 −.071
Secondary .368 .349 −.019
Above secondary .2 .27 .07
Missing .037 .057 .02
Observations 76,779 84,573
Notes: Means and standard deviations by exam regime, for variables used in empirical analysis. Individuals
from Germany, Canada, and the USA are included in the central exam group if their central exam factor is
> 0.5. Otherwise they are classified as non-central exam. Observations are weighted by adjusted sampling
weights that give same weight to each country. Baseline sample: high-school graduates aged 16-65. Numbers
of observations are smaller, than those indicated, for the following variables: for earnings, employment, and
college degree we exclude those still studying; earnings and employment sample additionally exclude those
younger than 25; problem-solving skills are not available for Cyprus, France, Italy, and Spain.
Table 2: The effect of central exams on adult skills
Outcome Numeracy skills Literacy Prob. solv.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Central exams .205*** .168*** .065*** .067*** .049*** .068*** .135*** .091***
(.019) (.017) (.015) (.018) (.017) (.020) (.021) (.020)
Female -.188*** -.188*** -.188*** -.017*** -.017*** -.079*** -.080***
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.007) (.007)
Second-gen. migrant -.023* -.026** -.009 -.031*** -.011 -.028** -.008
(.012) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.011) (.012) (.012)
Parent education:
Secondary .276*** .230*** .229*** .231*** .232*** .193*** .199***
(.009) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.010)
Above secondary .570*** .520*** .520*** .516*** .515*** .500*** .493***
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.012) (.012)
Educ. missing -.216*** -.204*** -.201*** -.164*** -.161*** -.053*** -.051***
(.018) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.018) (.018)
Grad. year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Grad. age FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-specific linear trend
in grad. year no no no yes no yes no yes
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 26 26
Observations 161,352 161,352 161,352 161,352 161,352 161,352 129,519 129,519
Clusters 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,453 1,453
R2 .100 .185 .253 .259 .246 .253 .203 .222
Notes: Least squares regressions weighted by adjusted sampling weights that give same weight to each country. Dependent variables are the globally
standardized test scores indicated in first row. Sample: high school graduates aged 16-65. Robust standard errors clustered by graduation year × country in
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3: The effect of central exams on labor market and education outcomes
Outcome Earnings Employment College degree High school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Central exams .008 −.003 .027* −.009
(.019) (.006) (.016) (.006)
Female −.176*** .004* .051*** .013***
(.006) (.002) (.005) (.002)
Second-gen. migrant .009 −.014*** −.002 .003
(.009) (.004) (.007) (.004)
Parents education:
Secondary .110*** .011*** .095*** .039***
(.007) (.003) (.005) (.003)
Above secondary .229*** .013*** .313*** .045***
(.008) (.003) (.007) (.003)
Educ. missing −.028* −.029*** −.039*** −.016*
(.015) (.007) (.009) (.009)
Grad. year FE yes yes yes yes
Grad. age FE yes yes yes yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Country-specific linear trend
in grad. year yes yes yes yes
Countries 30 30 30 30
Observations 70, 915 76, 025 62, 485 76, 025
Clusters 1, 383 1, 392 1, 313 1, 392
R2 .457 .087 .323 .547
Notes: Least squares regressions weighted by adjusted sampling weights that give same weight to each country.
Dependent variables are log gross hourly wage (column 1), an employment dummy (column 2), a dummy for
tertiary education degree (column 3), and a high school attainment dummy (column 4). Sample: individuals
aged 25-65 with non-zero earnings (column 1), individuals aged 25-65 with non-zero earnings and unemployed
(columns 2, 3, 4). Robust standard errors clustered by graduation year × country in parentheses. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis
Outcome Adult skills Labor market and education
Numeracy Literacy Prob. solv. Earnings Empl. College deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline .067*** .068*** .091*** .008 −.003 .027*
(.018) (.020) (.020) (.019) (.006) (.016)
No weights .079*** .089*** .087*** .018 −.001 .048***
(.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.007) (.014)
Median grad age .068*** .058*** .073*** .007 .007 .010
(.015) (.018) (.019) (.015) (.005) (.014)
Incl. early leavers .061*** .065*** .097*** .013 −.006 .031**
(.018) (.020) (.020) (.018) (.006) (.015)
Notes: Each cell reports an estimate from a separate regression weighted by adjusted sampling weights that
give same weight to each country, except for the second row, where we forgo using any weight. Only the
estimate of the central exam effect based on variants of Equation 1 is reported. Dependent variables are
globally standardized test scores in numeracy (column 1), literacy (column 2), problem-solving (column 3),
log gross hourly wage (column 4), an employment dummy (column 5), and a dummy for tertiary education
degree (column 6). “Incl. early leavers” row additionally includes individuals who, based on the calculatory
age of graduation (highest attained degree), is below 15, i.e. earlier than the compulsory leaving age in OECD
countries. Robust standard errors clustered by graduation year × country in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
Table 5: Piecewise deletion of countries
Numeracy Earnings
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Baseline .067*** .008 cont. cont.
(.018) (.019)
Excluded country:
Austria .067*** .009 Belgium .066*** .009
(.018) (.019) (.017) (.019)
Canada .067*** .008 Chile .066*** .009
(.017) (.019) (.017) (.019)
Cyprus .060*** .007 Czech Republic .071*** .010
(.019) (.019) (.018) (.019)
Denmark .066*** .009 Estonia .059*** .011
(.017) (.019) (.019) (.021)
Finland .066*** .009 France .067*** .009
(.017) (.019) (.017) (.019)
Germany .067*** .007 Greece .127*** .035*
(.018) (.019) (.018) (.020)
Ireland .067*** .007 Israel .065*** .008
(.018) (.019) (.017) (.019)
Italy .066*** .009 Japan .070*** -.011
(.018) (.019) (.019) (.020)
Korea .070*** .002 Lithuania .053*** .004
(.019) (.020) (.018) (.021)
Netherlands .071*** .013 New Zealand .067*** .009
(.019) (.020) (.017) (.019)
Norway .064*** .008 Poland .055*** .014
(.017) (.019) (.018) (.020)
Singapore .068*** .007 Slovak Republic .051*** .008
(.017) (.019) (.018) (.020)
Slovenia .071*** .012 Spain .065*** .010
(.019) (.021) (.017) (.019)
Sweden .069*** .002 Turkey .067*** .008
(.018) (.020) (.018) (.019)
United Kingdom .068*** .007 United States .067*** .008
(.017) (.019) (.018) (.019)
Excluded country groups:
Japan and Korea .075*** -.020 Federal education .067*** .007
(.020) (.021) systems (.018) (.019)
Notes: Each estimate stems from a separate regression excluding one or more countries. The regressions
are weighted by adjusted sampling weights that give same weight to each country. We report here only the
estimates of the central exam effect on numeracy (column (1)), which corresponds to the specification of Table
2, column (4), and the effect on earnings (column (2)), which corresponds to the specification of Table 3,
column (2). Dependent variable is the globally standardized test scores in numeracy, or log gross hourly wage,
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by graduation year × country in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 6: Central exams and adult outcomes in the German subsample
Outcome: Adult skills Labor market outcomes
Numeracy Literacy Prob. solv. Earnings Empl. College deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Central exams .112*** .100*** .056* −.005 .053*** .017
(.030) (.032) (.033) (.023) (.016) (.013)
Backgr. char. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Grad. age FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Grad. year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,086 4,086 3,646 2,098 2,949 3,250
Clusters 570 570 555 449 499 543
R2 .288 .279 .263 .255 .168 .506
Notes: Dependent variables: for numeracy, literacy and problem solving skills we use German-wide standard-
ized scores. For earnings we use log gross hourly wage, employment (Empl.) is a 0/1 variable, where 1 means
currently employed. The College deg. equals 1 if an individual completed any college. The College deg. esti-
mation excludes those currently studying, the Earnings and Employed estimations additionally exclude those
younger than 25. The set of controls used for the skill outcomes (column 1-3) is identical to our preferred
specification of Table 2 (column 4), the set of controls used for labor market outcomes (column 4-6) is identical
to Table 3. Estimations are weighted by sampling weights. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered
at graduation year × federal state. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 7: Subgroup analysis
Outcome Adult skills Labor market and education
Numeracy Literacy Prob. solv. Earnings Empl. College deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline:
Central exams .067*** .068*** .091*** .008 .014 .014
(.018) (.020) (.020) (.019) (.011) (.011)
With interactions by parental education:
Central exams .052*** .036* .114*** .051** .017 .018
(.020) (.021) (.024) (.021) (.013) (.012)
Secondary .011 .037** −.040** −.053*** −.007 .001
× Central exams (.015) (.015) (.019) (.014) (.009) (.008)
Tertiary .037* .065*** −.025 −.094*** −.003 −.027**
× Central exams (.019) (.019) (.025) (.017) (.011) (.011)
With interactions by gender:
Central exams .082*** .073*** .095*** −.013 .006 .003
(.019) (.021) (.022) (.021) (.012) (.012)
Female −.031*** −.008 −.009 .048*** .017* .022***
× Central exams (.012) (.011) (.014) (.013) (.009) (.007)
With interactions by migration background:
Central exams .064*** .066*** .086*** .006 .013 .013
(.018) (.020) (.020) (.019) (.011) (.011)
Second-gen. migrant .045** .030 .063** .027 .018 .009
× Central exams (.022) (.022) (.027) (.020) (.013) (.011)
Notes: Each cell reports an estimate from a separate regression for the outcome measure weighted by adjusted
sampling weights that give same weight to each country. Only the estimate of the central exam effect, which
corresponds to the specification of Table 2, column (4), is reported. Dependent variables are globally stan-
dardized test scores in numeracy (column 1), literacy (column 2), problem-solving (column 3), log gross hourly
wage (column 4), an employment dummy (column 5), and an indicator for tertiary education degree (column
6). Robust standard errors clustered by graduation year × country in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
Table 8: Time to effect
Outcome Numeracy skills
(1) (2) (3)
Central exams .067*** .023 .022
(.018) (.024) (.024)
Central exams 2+ .058** .066**
(.026) (.032)
Central exams 5+ −.012
(.031)
Countries 27 27 27
Observations 131,398 131,398 131,398
Clusters 1,361 1,361 1,361
R2 .265 .265 .265
Notes: Estimates in column (1) correspond to our baseline specification, of Table 2, column (4) for our sample
without the three countries with federal education systems, i.e. Canada, Germany, and the United States. In
column (2), an additional effect of “2 years after the introduction” is amended (Central exams 2+), additionally
in column (3) an effect of “5 years after the introduction” is included (Central exams 5+). All estimates are
weighted by adjusted sampling weights that give same weight to each country. Robust standard errors clustered
by graduation year × country in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 9: Comparison with correlations in PISA and TIMSS
PIAAC PISA PIAAC TIMSS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Central exams .074 .175 .262 .361
(.140) (.124) (.244) (.290)
Countries 18 18 13 13
Observations 1,899 46,856 1,067 51,957
R2 .018 .013 .033 .036
Notes: Dependent variable: globally standardized numeracy score for PIAAC and standardized math scores
for PISA and TIMSS. PISA data refers to the PISA 2000 wave. TIMSS data refers to the 1999 TIMSS-Repeat
study. The estimations in the PIAAC columns are based on a sample of PIAAC individuals who were 15
years old in 2000. The estimations in all columns except (1) are limited to the selection of countries which are
common to PIAAC/PISA and PIAAC/TIMSS. All estimations are weighted by adjusted weights, where each
country’s weights sum up to 1. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table A1: Introduction of central exit examinations (CEE) at the upper secondary level (ISCED 3) across PIAAC countries
Country Year of CEE-Introduction Source
Austria 2016 Ministerium für Bildung und Frauen Österreich (BMBF):
https://www.bmbf.gv.at/schulen/unterricht/ba/reifepruefung.html
Belgium - Hörner et al. (2007), Centre for Educational research, London School of Economics and Political Science:
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/00001195.htm
Canada? 1929-1984 General Accounting Office, Washington, 1993:
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED361377.pdf,
https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED361377
Chile - OECD (2010)
Cyprus 2006 Lamprianou (2012), Hörner et al. (2007),
Ministry of Education Cyprus: http://www.highereducation.ac.cy/en/examinations.html
Czech Republic 2011 Greger and Kifer (2012), expert based evaluation
Denmark 1908 Hörner et al. (2007), Bishop (1999)
Estonia 1997 Education fact sheets on http://archimedes.ee,
http://www.innove.ee/en/general-education/final-examinations/secondary-school
Finland 1919 Matriculation Examination Board Finland:
https://www.ylioppilastutkinto.fi/fi/english
Notes: ?Countries with federal school systems. CEE introduction years differ across federal states. See Table A2 for more detailed information.
The term “personal communication/expert based evaluation” refers to information provided by experts of the respective national education system. This
comprises qualitative interviews or e-mail communication with national centers responsible for the execution and evaluation of central exams.
Table A1: Continued
Country Year of CEE-Introduction Source
France 1808 Hörner et al. (2007), Ministry of Education France:
http://www.education.gouv.fr/cid60987/bac-2015-questions-reponses.html
Germany? 1945-2007 Lüdemann (2011), Klein et al. (2009)
Greece 1983, abolished in 2005 Goulas and Megalokonomou (2015), Polydorides (1986), expert based evaluation
Ireland 1960 State examination Commission Ireland:
https://www.examinations.ie/?l=en&mc=li&sc=li
Department of Education and Skills:
http://www.education.ie/en/The-Education-System/Post-Primary/
Italy 1923 Nardi (2001), expert based evaluation
Israel 1923 Yemini et al. (2014), Lavy (2008)
Japan 1979 Eckstein and Noah (1989), Watanabe (2013) expert based evaluation
Lithuania 2002 Bethell and Zabulionis (2000), OECD (2002)
Korea 1994 Chang (2009)
Korea Institute of Curriculum and Evaluation:
http://www.kice.re.kr/sub/info.do?m=0205&s=english
The Netherlands 1968 Hörner et al. (2007), Boezerooy and Huisman (2000), Government of the Netherlands:
https://www.government.nl/topics/secondary-education/contents/
secondary-school-leaving-examination




Norway 1960 Hörner et al. (2007), Organization for Internationalization in Education:
https://www.epnuffic.nl/en/publications/find-a-publication/education-system-norway.pdf
Notes: ?Countries with federal school systems. CEE introduction years differ across federal states. See Table A2 for more detailed information.
Japan and Korea have national university entrance exams that consider to be equivalent to a central exam in our main specification. The term “personal
communication/expert based evaluation” refers to information provided by experts of the respective national education system. This comprises qualitative
interviews or e-mail communication with national centers responsible for the execution and evaluation of central exams.
Israel introduced its system of central exams “Bagrut” in 1923, during the British Mandate of Palestine (1920-1948).
Table A1: Continued
Country Year of CEE-Introduction Source
Poland 2005 The Central Examination Commission:
http://www.cke.edu.pl/,
http://www.cke.edu.pl/images/stories/English/the_matura_exam.pdf
Singapore 1975 Statement Singapore Examinations and Assessment Board:
http://www.seab.gov.sg/pages/nationalExaminations/GAL/general.asp
Bishop (1997), Lim and Tan (1999)
Slovenia 1994 Ilc et al. (2014)
Spain - Bishop (1999), Fuchs and Wößmann (2008), Hörner et al. (2007)
Slovak Republik 2005 National Institute for Certified Educational Measurement:
http://www.nucem.sk/en/maturita
http://www.nucem.sk/en/maturita#3/brief-history-of-maturita
Sweden eliminated in 1968 Bishop (1999), Hörner et al. (2007)
Turkey - Yildirim et al. (2007), Measuring, Selection and Placement Center Turkey: http://www.osym.gov.tr/
belge/1-2706/tarihsel-gelisme.html
United Kingdom in 1950’s http://www.a-levels.co.uk/history-of-a-levels.html
United States? 2003 Caves and Balestra (2018)
Notes: ?Countries with federal school systems. CEE introduction years differ across federal states. See Table A2 for more detailed information.
Table A2: Central exit examinations at the upper secondary level (ISCED 3) in
countries with federal school systems
Country Federal state Year of CEE-Introduction
Canada Alberta 1984
British Columbia 1984
Manitoba eliminated 1970/reintroduced 1991
Newfoundland/Labrador 1974
New Brunswick (francophone) 1991
New Brunswick (anglophone) -
Northwest Territories -
Nova Scotia eliminated 1972
Nunavut -
Ontario eliminated 1967











Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania (MV) 1991
Lower Saxony (LS) 2006
North-Rhine Westphalia (NW) 2007






USAb New York 2002
Notes: aFederal states in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) were de facto central exam
states, before 1990, as in the GDR there was a central examination regime in place (Kühn 2010). Years
listed in the table indicate the introduction of central exams after the German reunification. Further, we
only refer to central exams at the end of secondary school. Central exams in low school tracks are not
considered. According to Lüdemann (2011), time of introduction in the highest track was timely close to
the introduction of central exams in the lower school tracks in Germany.
bIn the USA, only the federal state of New York has a centralized school leaving exam (Regents
Examination) that meets our definition of a central exit exam.
Table A3: Coding of central exams in Fuchs and Wößmann (2008) compared to
our coding across PIAAC/PISA and PIAAC/TIMMS countries
Country F&W Our Dataset
Austria 0 0 PISA
Belgium 0 0 PISA/TIMMS
Canada 0.5 0.537 PISA/TIMMS
Chile - 0 TIMMS
Cyprus - 0 TIMMS
Czech Republic 1 0 PISA/TIMMS
Denmark 1 1 PISA
Finland 1 1 PISA/TIMMS
France 1 1 PISA
Germany 0.4 0.424 PISA
Greece 0 1 PISA
Ireland 1 1 PISA
Israel - 1 TIMMS
Italy 1 1 PISA/TIMMS
Japan 1 1 PISA/TIMMS
Korea 1 1 PISA/TIMMS
Lithuania - 0 TIMMS
Netherlands 1 1 PISA/TIMMS
New Zealand 1 1 PISA/TIMMS
Norway 1 1 PISA
Poland 1 0 PISA
Singapore - 1 TIMMS
Slovak Republic - 0 TIMMS
Slovenia - 1 TIMMS
Spain 0 0 PISA
Sweden 0.5 0 PISA
Turkey - 0 TIMMS
United Kingdom 1 1 PISA/TIMMS
United States 0.1 0.067 PISA/TIMMS
